AI Research
The Two Genie Game: Adoption and Welfare in Audit-Grounded AI Governance
We ask under what conditions an agent with a harm-minimizing policy can displace an approval-seeking (RLHF) agent in a competitive market, and when that policy is sufficient to prevent community harm. We use evolutionary game theory (finite-population Moran-Fermi pairwise compari...
AC
ArXiv CS.AI
Source
2 min
ArXiv CS.AIRead the full story at ArXiv CS.AI
AI Analysis
Generated insight by OnAirToday AI
This research uses game theory to explore how AI agents focused on minimizing harm can outperform traditional approval-seeking models in competitive environments. It reveals that while harm-minimizing agents can be adopted, their long-term effectiveness depends critically on aligning with community values and the timeframe of evaluation, with a risk of locking in harm if not properly managed.
Powered by AI • Not a substitute for human analysisMore Insights →
Share
Filed under:AI Research
Comments
Keep comments relevant and respectful. No links, advertising, self-promotion, or spam.