AI Research

    The Two Genie Game: Adoption and Welfare in Audit-Grounded AI Governance

    We ask under what conditions an agent with a harm-minimizing policy can displace an approval-seeking (RLHF) agent in a competitive market, and when that policy is sufficient to prevent community harm. We use evolutionary game theory (finite-population Moran-Fermi pairwise compari...

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    ArXiv CS.AI

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    This research uses game theory to explore how AI agents focused on minimizing harm can outperform traditional approval-seeking models in competitive environments. It reveals that while harm-minimizing agents can be adopted, their long-term effectiveness depends critically on aligning with community values and the timeframe of evaluation, with a risk of locking in harm if not properly managed.

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